Iwannis of Dârâ On Soul’s Virtues
About a Late Antiquity Greek Philosophical Work
among Syrians and Arabs

Mauro Zonta

Abstract
The Syriac author Iwannîs of Dârâ (first half of the 9th century), in his still unpublished Treatise on the Soul, employed a pseudo-Platonic treatise On the Subsistence of Soul’s Virtues among his sources: a treatise whose text is lost in Greek, but is preserved in an Arabic version. A comparison of the Arabic version with the Syriac quotations found in Iwannîs of Dârâ’s work strongly suggests that the former depends upon a lost Syriac complete version, from which the latter was taken, too. The Syriac version also influenced some passages of Severus bar Šâkkô’s Book of Dialogues, so showing the diffusion of this text by this way in Near East till to 1240. Moreover, there is a still unknown influence of it upon a passage of a Judaeo-Arabic author, a contemporary and compatriot of Iwannîs of Dârâ: Dawûd al-Muqammi’s Twenty Chapters, where the same Syriac text found in Iwannîs of Dârâ’s own work seems to have been used as a source. This passage of Dawûd al-Muqammi’s work might have influenced even a passage of Ahmad ibn Miskawayh’s Correction of Morals.

In the Appendix, the Syriac terminology of some important passages of Iwannîs of Dârâ’s work are compared with the terminology found in the corresponding passages of some Patristic Greek and Arabic texts.

The Syriac author Iwannîs of Dârâ (first half of the 9th century), whose life is completely unknown, was apparently a writer of many books. However, the number of his exegetical, theological and philosophical works (most of which are unpublished), the sources and the real influences they exerted on Syriac literature have not yet been examined in detail. Henri Hugonnard-Roche and I have shown elsewhere some different aspects of the relevance of his Treatise on the Soul on the history of Medieval Syriac philosophy, particularly about psychology. In the latter, we have shown the importance of Iwannîs of Dârâ’s work for the fate of Greek Patristic philosophical literature among Syrians, particularly about that of two works by Gregory of Nyssa: On Soul and Resurrection and Epistle to Letoios. Moreover, this work had some impact for the reconstruction of a Greek text and its role in the history of Syriac philosophy and philosophical terminology – as we will try to show here below. We have to examine the significance of one of the many philosophical themes dealt with by Iwannîs of Dârâ in his treatise: the soul’s virtues. By this way, we will take the opportunity of demonstrating the spreading of this

theme (likely originating by a Greek scholastic compilation) among Arabic philosophers in the period between the 9th and the 13th century, throughout a still unknown Syriac medium.

In the first part of Chapter 5 of Book 5 of his Treatise on the Soul, Iwannis of Darā deals with an ethical theme related to psychology: the classification of the four cardinal virtues as resulting from the threefold division of soul, as well as from the balance of eight opposite vices – each of them being in the golden mean. From a philosophical point of view, this theme bears clear evidence for the merging of Platonism and Aristotelianism into a new mixed doctrine, which is found in late-antique Greek, Syriac and Arabic thought. Iwannis of Darā’s ethical classification runs as follows:

MS Harvard, Houghton Library, syr. 47, folios 8 va, line 22 - vb, line 27, and 14 ra, lines 1-19

Chapter five, about the soul’s faculties, and their best state (qiyyāmā) and inclination (mestalyūnūtā). They say that the soul has three powers, as follows: “rationality” (mlīlātā), “anger” (hemtā) and “desire” (regtā). If (the virtue results) from the perfection of “rationality” is called “wisdom” (ḥakimītā). If “anger” is (directed) only against evil (the resulting virtue) is called “strength” (ḥayltānūtā). If “desire” is directed only towards what is right (the resulting virtue) is called “decency” (knīkūtā). “Justice”, in fact, is what gives to everyone his portion of food – the food of anger and desire, (which) are subject to rationality and are administered by it. Each of these three virtues (myataraqātā) is placed in the mean of two vices, between excess (jatīrūtā) and deficiency (bašūrūtā). Excess of rationality produces “slyness” (mdarmūtā): “slyness” is not only to care for his own interests, but (also) to disclose a bad (...) to others. Deficiency of rationality produces

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4 This is a well-known Platonic theme: see Plat., Resp. IV, 439 B ff.
5 The MS Harvard totally omits these words, which I have added and put between angle brackets; this omission is probably due to a homeoteleuton.
“stupidity” (*pat’ūṭā*). On the other hand, excess of anger produces “audacity” (*mrāḥūṭā*), its deficiency, “timidity” (*dhūlhānūṭā*), because struggling against inferior adversaries is a wrong thing, just as struggling against superior ones. Excess of desire produces “intemperance” (*śīḥūṭā*), while its deficiency (produces) “motionlessness” (*lā mettzi ānūṭā*), since it is right not only to reject desire towards everyone, but also not to desire the evil of a good man. As for justice, it is placed between two vices: “avarice” (*ālāḥūṭā*) and “deficiency of property” (*ț ārūṭ qanāyūṭā*), since, when justice is little, there is avarice; when it is abundant, and (a man) does not even possess what is (necessary) to feed him, there is deficiency of property.

Iwānnīs of Dārā’s exposition goes on explaining that every vice is opposed not only to a virtue, but to another vice too. Some men say that, if there are two vices opposite to one virtue, the state of things is not right; according to him, on the contrary, each virtue is the result of the balance of the two vices opposite to it.

Unfortunately, the MS Harvard here employed is quite defective in this point, so it is difficult to establish a sure text. Nevertheless, Iwānnīs of Dārā’s general argumentation is clear: all this doctrine lies upon a rather scholastic and rigid classification of virtues and vices that is typical of early Syriac philosophy – one can also compare the various Medieval Syriac “books of definitions and divisions” about these philosophical terms. Anyway, no reference to the above classification is apparently found in any of them.

At a first glance, the Greek origin of such a classification is quite evident. Some terms employed by Iwānnīs of Dārā are patterned after a Greek equivalent word: *lā mettzi ānūṭā*, literally “the fact of not being in motion”, closely corresponds to *δυσκεχνήσις*, a term to be found in ethical writings too, meaning “sluggishness”; *ț ārūṭ qanāyūṭā*, literally “smallness of property”, seems to be a substantially literal rendering of the Greek term *ἀξεδίζη*, literally “lack of benefit”. Unfortunately, no direct Greek source of this Syriac passage can be pointed out: it is likely found in the wide apocryphal literature ascribed to Plato and Aristotle – actually being late scholastic compulsory writings, which aim to resume a mixed Neoplatonic-Aristotelian doctrine. We should remember the existence of two Arabic translations of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Virtutibus et vitiiis*, both of which rely upon a Syriac version from Greek: Theodor Abū Qurrah (first half of the 9th cent.) and Abū l-Faraq ibn al-Ṭayib (d. 1043), however, these versions reproduce a classification of virtues and vices quite different from Iwānnīs of Dārā’s one – it is more nuanced, but more confused too.

Two texts of this kind gained considerable success among the Syrians and the Arabs: pseudo-Gregory the Thaumaturge’s *Λόγος κεφαλαίων τέκνων τοῖς ψυχῆς*, a compendious work about soul, which was widely circulating in Syriac and Arabic versions as attributed to Aristotle, and a pseudo-

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10. Both were published and rendered into German by M. Kellermann, *Ein pseudaristotelischen Traktat über die Tugend*, J. Hogl, Erlangen 1965.
11. See the original Greek text in *PG*, vol. X, cc. 1137-1146 Migne.
Platonic treatise *On the Subsistence of Soul’s Virtues* (in Arabic, *Maqāla fi iḥā’at fadā’il al-nafs*), of which only the Arabic text has been found so far.\(^1\) In particular, the latter includes a classification of the four cardinal virtues as related to the three souls, which, by the way, appears to have influenced a renowned Arab-Islamic philosophical writing on ethics: Ahmad ibn Miskawayh’s *Correction of Customs* (*Tahdīb al-ahlāq*), written around 1000 AD.\(^2\)

This pseudo-Platonic treatise on virtues, if not directly related to Iwānīs of Dārā’s classification of vices, shows to have been well-known by the Syriac author; as a matter of fact, it was employed as a source of a previous passage, that is, the second part of chapter 4, book 5 of his *Treatise on the Soul*. The correspondences run as follows:\(^3\)

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ps-Plato, <em>On the Subsistence of Soul’s Virtues</em>, p. 31.46-60 Daiber</th>
<th>Iwānīs of Dārā, <em>Treatise on the Soul</em>, MS Harvard, Houghton Library, syr. 47, folio 8ra, line 24 - va, line 22</th>
<th>English compared literal version of both sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>فاَما الفلاسِفة وأهْل الْرُوَاُقِ وَالْمُشَاهِدَينَ وَمَا يَجْعَلُونَ</td>
<td>The philosophers and the Stoics and the Peripatetics and all the natural philosophers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>وَجَمِيعُ الْطَّبَعِيْنِ</td>
<td>among whom (there is) Aristotle, as he is someone whom I do not know who he is, put/open the discourse (by saying) that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>الْجَسَدُ جَوْزًا مِنِّ الْإِنْسَانِ لَا أَدَأْهُ</td>
<td>the true body as/is part of man, not as his instrument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>فَرَأَيْتُهُمُ فِي هَذَا الْأَمْرِ غَيْرِ رَأِيٍّ أَوَّلِهِ</td>
<td>Their/they bring another opinions about this are/is different with respect to the opinion of the best ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>يَفْيِقُونَ فِي هَذِهِ الْأَرْبَعُ الْفَضْلَاءِ الْمَعْمُّودِ، وَلَكِنَّ هَذِهِ الْأَرْبَعُ الْفَضْلَاءِ الْمَعْمُّودِ</td>
<td>In fact, they state that these/the four virtues/customs are not sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>وَذَلِكَ أَنَّهُمْ قَالُوُاً لاَّنَاً إِنَّا لَأَنَاهُمْ لَمْ تَذَكَّرُوا فِي أَسْتِكْانَ السَّعَاءِ (ٍ)</td>
<td>(i.e.) what we have/it has been mentioned about the whole perfection of happiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>مَعْمُوَّدَةً مَعْمُوَّدَةً لَّدَى الْحُكْمَةِ لَحْيَةً</td>
<td>if they are not helped by the body, and by those around it/from outside:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{2}\) Cp. Daiber, “Ein bisher unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text”, p. 30.31-37 (Arabic text); p. 33 (German translation); pp. 37-39 (commentary), where some references of Greek sources of this doctrine are given.

\(^{3}\) Column 1 of the table includes the Arabic text. Column 2 includes the corresponding Syriac passage, where the abbreviations are spelled out, and some words, which cannot be read in the MS Harvard and were probably found in the original text, are put between angle brackets; where the reconstruction of these lost words is impossible, there is the following sign: (...). Column 3 includes an English literal version of each Arabic and Syriac corresponding passage: if Arabic and Syriac are in agreement, the English version is put in normal letters; the differences between Arabic and Syriac terms or phrases are put in italics and bold respectively.

in fact, they state that three are the things, that is, soul and body and those around/ (which are) of the body. Therefore, they say that who needs what is the perfection of happiness will be full of all goods which are from these three things.

They state that to/in each one of these three (things there are) goods; so they say that the goods of/in the soul those which are the four genera of the above four virtues and/best thing which has been said from outside that it is goods of the body: the excellence of forms and the integrity of members/parts and the health of the temperament of body and the delicateness of the senses and those which are by hearth they state to be the goods of what is around the body: the wealth and the richness and the power and the luxury and the order and prohibition and the like.

All the wise men and the natural (philosophers) put the perfection of virtues and happiness in all the goods of/best customs together with which has been put to be now in body and in what is outside, around the body, and this is what we have mentioned about the goods of richness/the natural authors are stating all these things together with the whole of those four virtues described; and because of this they say:

17 MS Harvard.
18 MS Harvard.
If somebody is lacking of some of the virtues of these three dispositions/one of all these (ones), he has not the whole virtue/best thing.

And we have already collected from this thing/like the intelligence which is found towards their thought.

where their goodness is marked: it is nobler than the other virtues/what includes all of them in a better:

off it is asceticism and pilgrimage and seclusion and exile,

and the renounce of body and the shortcoming of riches

are an important thing/a superiority and a perfect lacking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Arabic Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>إن عدم أحد بشئا من فضائل هذه الثلاثة الخصال</td>
<td>If somebody is lacking of some of the virtues of these three dispositions/one of all these (ones), he has not the whole virtue/best thing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>وليس بتام الفضل</td>
<td>And we have already collected from this thing/like the intelligence which is found towards their thought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>وقد نجتمع عليهم من ذلك الأمر</td>
<td>where their goodness is marked: it is nobler than the other virtues/what includes all of them in a better:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>الذي يميز جوهمه: أكرم من سائر أهل الفضل من التشهد والاجابة والانفراد والغربية وهرجان الجسد والنخل من الأموال شيء عظيم ونقصان كامل</td>
<td>off it is asceticism and pilgrimage and seclusion and exile, and the renounce of body and the shortcoming of riches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The discovery of the above long Syriac quotation of this pseudo-Platonic treatise once more shows the wide-spreading influence of late-antique apocryphal literature on psychology and related matters on Syriac and Medieval Arabic literature. In first instance, it confirms the existence of a Syriac Zwischenübersetzung of this treatise, which, on its turn, traces back to a late-Hellenistic origin. In fact, it is quite certain that Iwānnīs of Dārā did not translate this text from the Arabic version, but, as always in his works, he employed an already existent Syriac translation of it. Secondly, it proves one of the still relatively few examples of a direct Syriac ancestor of an Arabic philosophical text. Thirdly, from the above data we can deduce that this writing gained success in Mesopotamian Syriac and Arab-Islamic philosophical circles from 800 to 1000 AD: it was translated from Greek into Syriac before the first half of the 9th century, since this version was employed by a Monophysite author (Iwānnīs of Dārā) who lived in Northern Mesopotamia; then, it was translated from Syriac to Arabic before 950 – as a matter of fact, the only preserved manuscript of this translation has been kept in a library put in Northern Mesopotamia till now; finally, this Arabic version was quoted by Ibn Miskawayh, a Mesopotamian Arab-Islamic writer of Persian origin.

We may suppose that the common fate of such writings as pseudo-Gregory’s Λόγος and pseudo-Plato’s On the Subsistence of Soul’s Virtues was shared by other scholastic text of Greek origin about soul, which were translated into Syriac and hence into Arabic. This fact leads to conclude that also Iwānnīs of Dārā’s classification on virtues and vices was taken from a similar writing. As a matter of fact, we have found no other close Greek parallel to Iwānnīs of Dārā’s classification, but we are able to indicate some interesting correspondences to the above passage in Syriac and Judaean-Arabic literature.

First of all, the same classification is found in a late 13th century Syriac philosophical encyclopaedia, the Book of Dialogues by Severus bar Šakkō, alias Jacob of Bar Ṭellā (d. 1241). Only a part of this

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10 So in the MS Harvard. Was the term read by the Arabic translator as ۲۸۸، “pilgrimage”, too?
11 In Syriac, literally: “the lacking which is perfection”.
12 This fact was already suspected, but not proved, by Daiber, “Ein bisher unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text”, p. 28.
12 This is the MS Mosul, al-Madrasa al-ḥamadiyya, n. 152, folio 88r, lines 1–44, described in Daiber, “Ein bisher unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text”, p. 27 (with a photographic reproduction of the relevant folio).
wide work has been published so far,24 most of its philosophical section, found in book 2, discourse 2 of it, is still in manuscript. In particular, the tenth question (ṣūlā) of the second part (adšā) of the above discourse (memnā), about “practical philosophy” (ethics, economics, and politics),25 includes a classification of virtues and vices related to the three parts of soul, which, at a first glance, appears to be almost identical to that found in Iwānnis of Dārā, except from some terminological differences. The contents of this classification and their comparison to those of Iwānnis of Dārā (see the above passage) are put in the following table.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severus bar Ṣakkō, Book of Dialogues, book 2, discourse 2, part 2, question 10</th>
<th>Iwānnis of Dārā, Treatise on the Soul, book 5, chapter 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 ḥulīkā, “rationality”; 1.1 its virtues are ḥakīmātā, “wisdom”, and mīhuṇūtā, “intuition”; they are placed between two opposite vices:</td>
<td>1 mīlītātā, “rationality”; 1.1 its virtue is ḥakīmātā, “wisdom”; it is placed between two opposite vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 mdarmātā, “slyness” (an excess of rationality); 1.3 paṭʿūtā, “stupidity” (a deficiency of rationality).</td>
<td>1.2 mdarmātā, “slyness”; 1.3 paṭʿūtā, “stupidity”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 beṃtā, “anger”; 2.1 its virtues are lūṣtā, “fortitude”, and līḥḥātā, “courage”; they are placed between two opposite vices:</td>
<td>2 beṃtā, “anger”; 2.1 its virtue is ḥayltānūtā, “strength”; it is placed between two opposite vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 marḥūṭā (sic), “audacity”; 2.3 ḏūḥānūtā, “timidity”.</td>
<td>2.2 marḥūṭā, “audacity”; 2.3 ḏūḥānūtā, “timidity”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ḍeqtā, “desire”; 3.1 its virtues are knīkūtā, “decency”, and sāqūtā, “continence”; they are placed between two vices:</td>
<td>3 ḍeqtā, “desire”; 3.1 its virtue is knīkūtā, “decency”; it is placed between two vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 knītūtā, “justice”; this virtue is placed between two vices:</td>
<td>4 knītūtā, “justice”; this virtue is placed between two vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 ḍalḥūtā, “avarice”, “oppression”; 4.2 mēʾālānūtā, “the fact of being oppressed”.</td>
<td>4.1 ḍalḥūtā, “avarice”, “oppression”; 4.2 zūrūt qanāyūtā, “deficiency of property”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A detailed comparison between Iwānnis of Dārā’s scheme and Severus bar Ṣakkō’s one shows that, although their Syriac original source is identical, the latter reshaped some aspects of the terminology, probably under the influence of Arabic ethical writings too. It can be noticed that, e.g., he calls the virtue of “anger” as līḥḥātā, “courage”, a term closer to the Arabic word saḡā’a (the common term for “courage” as virtue of the irascible part of human soul)26 than ḥayltānūtā; the virtue of the appetitive part is also called sāqūtā, “continence”, so rendering the common Arabic term ʿiffa, “continence”, better than the word used by Iwānnis of Dārā, knīkūtā, whose original meaning is “prudence, dignity”; the excess of desire is also called yaʿnūtā, “cupidity”, which corresponds to the Arabic word šarāb, “avidity”.27

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25 We have consulted it in the MS London, British Library, Add. 21454, folios 193 r, line 26-194 r, line 5.
26 Cp. e.g. Ahmad ibn Miskawayh, Tabdīl al-ablāq, Idārat al-Waṭan, Cairo 1298/1881, pp. 11.22 ff.
The number of Arabic texts reproducing the scholastic ethical scheme which is known to Iwānnīs of Dārā and Severus bar Šakkō is really limited. As far as we know, the only ethical-philosophical writing which, in 9th-, 10th- and 11th-centuries literature, reproduces this model is Ibn Miskawayh’s Correction of Customs. In the first treatise (maqāla) of this work, on chapter 5, there is a rigid classification of four virtues; each of them is placed between two opposite vices, as follows:

1. the virtue of the rational soul (al-nāṭiq) is “wisdom” (ḥikma); it is placed between “folly” (ṣifḥ) which, according to Ibn Miskawayh, people call “slynness” (gārbaza), and “stupidity” (balūḥ);
2. the virtue of the appetitive soul (al-sabwāyya) is “continence” (iḥsā), which is placed between “avidity” (jarāḥ) and “apathy” (ḥumūd al-sabwa, literally “quietness of the appetition”);
3. the virtue of the irascible soul (al-ğadbiyya) is “courage” (ṣağāʿa), which is placed between “cowardice” (gubn) and “violent roughness” (baraq);
4. “justice” (adāla) is placed between “oppression” (ẓulm) and “to be oppressed” (inṣīlām). Strangely enough, Ibn Miskawayh explains the first term as “avarice, avidity of possession”, the second one as “abstinence from possession”.

The above general scheme is very similar to Iwānnīs of Dārā’s one, but some differences occur: for example, the second and third faculties of human soul, “anger” and “desire” in Iwānnīs of Dārā, are inverted in Ibn Miskawayh; and some philosophical terms are put in the same positions but have not identical meanings in both authors.

These resemblances to the classification of virtues and vices found in Iwānnīs of Dārā also result in a work by a Judaeo-Arabic author, surely older than Ibn Miskawayh but probably a younger contemporary and countryman of Iwānnīs of Dārā: Dawūd ibn Marwān al-Muqammīs, who seems to have lived and worked in Northern Syria and Iraq in the second quarter of the 9th century. According to the available biographical data about him, for a period he converted to Christianity and studied with Nonnus of Nisibi (d. after 861), a renowned Monophysite author who lived in that period and milieu. In his theological summary, the Twenty Chapters (Iṣrāʿ Maqāla), he inserted some paragraphs about the classification of virtues and vices, which have been only hastily studied so far. A direct comparison of Dawūd al-Muqammīs’s classification with Iwānnīs of Dārā’s one shows that the relationship between these two ethical schemes is very close in contents as well as in terminology, so that we can suppose that the former employed exactly the same Syriac source which had been first used by the latter. The following table of comparison of their contents will better show this relationship.

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We can observe al-Muqammi’s use of such terms as ṣ in Ibn Miskawayh, al-Muqammi’s terminology seems to have been directly translated from the Syriac. ṣnnās of Dād’s one. Although the order of virtues and vices is partially inverted, just like it is found to Iwānīs of Dārā, Treatise on the Soul, book 5, chapter 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 fikra, “reason” (p. 281.5 Stroumsa); cp. also fikriyya, “rational (faculty), rationality” (p. 243.4 Stroumsa):</td>
<td>1 mlilātā, “rationality”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 its virtue is ḥikma, “wisdom” (p. 281.7 Stroumsa); it is placed between two opposite vices:</td>
<td>1.1 its virtue is ḫaǧimūṭā, “wisdom”; it is placed between two opposite vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 ḡarbaτa, “slyness” (p. 283.2 Stroumsa);</td>
<td>1.2 mdarmūṭā, “slyness”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 muqīn, “stupidity” (p. 283.2 Stroumsa); cp. also ruʾāna, “frivolity” (p. 287.8 Stroumsa),</td>
<td>1.3 paṯṭātā, “stupidity”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 šawaḥa, “desire” (p. 281.5 Stroumsa):</td>
<td>2 ṭaḡtā, “desire”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 its virtue is ʾifā, “continence” (p. 281.7 Stroumsa); cp. also ḥayā, “prudence, dignity” (p. 287.3 Stroumsa). It is placed between two vices:</td>
<td>2.1 its virtue is knikītā, “decency”; it is placed between two vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 muḍ̄i, “impudence” (p. 283.3 Stroumsa), and cp. also qibba, “impudence” (p. 285.7 Stroumsa):</td>
<td>2.2 ṣribūtā, “intemperance”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 its virtue is qawwa, “strength” (p. 281.7 Stroumsa), and cp. also ṣag̣āʾa, “courage” (p. 283.5 Stroumsa); it is placed between two opposite vices:</td>
<td>3.1 its virtue is ḥaytānūṭā, “strength”; it is placed between two opposite vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 saḥb, “folly” (p. 283.4 Stroumsa); cp. also ḥaraq, “imprudence” (p. 287.3 Stroumsa);</td>
<td>2.2 mrāḥtā, “audacity”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 ḡubn, “timidity” (p. 283.5 Stroumsa).</td>
<td>2.3 dḥilātānūṭā, “timidity”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 ʾadd, “justice” (p. 281.7 Stroumsa); this virtue is placed between two vices:</td>
<td>4 kinūṭā, “justice”; this virtue is placed between two vices:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 ṣuln, “oppression” (p. 285.10 Stroumsa);</td>
<td>4.1 ʾalāḥtā, “avarice”, “oppression”:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4.2 inṣīlām, “the fact of being oppressed” (p. 285.10 Stroumsa). | 4.2 zūrūṯ qanāyūṭā, “deficiency of property”.

As it seems, al-Muqammi’s terminology, despite some incongruences, shows a noteworthy similarity to Iwānīs of Dārā’s one. Although the order of virtues and vices is partially inverted, just like it is found in Ibn Miskawayh, al-Muqammi’s terminology seems to have been directly translated from the Syriac. We can observe al-Muqammi’s use of such terms as ḥammīyya, which really appears to be a literal rendering of the Syriac term ḥemtā, since the original meanings (“inflammation”) and the phonetic radicals (ḥ-m-[m]) of both are identical; ḥayā, “prudence, dignity”, which is apparently closer to the

52 This seems to be the correct reading, confirmed by the comparison of Ibn Miskawayh’s parallel passage, of the word yezīm, which is found in the unique manuscript of Dāwūd al-Muqammi’s work (see Stroumsa, Dāwūd Ibn Marwar al-Muqammi’s Twenty Chapters, p. 285, n. 102), but has been differently emended by Stroumsa into tazālām, “inequity.”
Syriac kniḵūtā, “decency”, than ṣifā, “continence”; quwwa, which in Arabic means “strength”, is closer to the Syriac ḥaylānūṭa, literally “strengthness”, which derives from ḥaylā, “strength, potency, power”, than ṣaḡā’ā, whose meaning, “courage”, is partially different; insīṣād haraḳa and qillat haraḳa, literally “scarcity of motion”, which literally correspond to the Syriac term la mettti anūṭa, “not to be moved, sluggishness, motionlessness”. Particularly the last two Arabic terms cannot be philosophically explained without resorting to a Syriac antecedent.

The only substantial difference is found between Ḩwānīs of Dārā’s classification of vices opposed to justice and al-Muqammiš’s one. However, in this case, this fact can be explained on the basis of an error in the textual tradition of an original Syriac term. The word ʿalūḥūtā, here in the sense of “oppression”, might have been an erroneous variant-reading of an original Syriac term, awlūtā, “injustice”, which corresponds to the Greek term ἀδίκεζων, “doing injustice”. Therefore, the neologism met’albānūṭa, “the fact of being oppressed”, was created by somebody who wanted to provide a literal but incorrect translation for the vice opposite to it, in Greek τὸ ἀδίκεζοςθεῖν, that is to say, “the fact of receiving injustice”. But the Syriac term ʿalūḥūtā has another sense too: that of “avidity, avarice” – hence, “the fact of acquiring goods”. Ḩwānīs of Dārā probably took into consideration the latter sense, compared it with the Greek τὸ ἀδίκεζοςθεῖν, and created its opposite term, as follows: zīʿūrīt qaṇāyūṭa, literally “the fact of acquiring few goods”, so meaning “deficiency of property”. Such word was possibly created by Ḩwānīs of Dārā, but was not used by other Syriac authors who employed this source, like Severus bar Šakkō. In fact, the Syriac-to-Arabic translator of this work might have rendered met’albānūṭa as inzilām, “the fact of being oppressed”; the latter was used by al-Muqammiš, and Ibn Miskawayh apparently merged the above two different meanings of this key-point of the pseudo-Platonic treatise into one, by giving to inzilām the strange meaning of “abstinence from possession, abstinence from acquiring goods”. Ibn Miskawayh might have even used al-Muqammiš’s work as his unrecognized source.

To sum up, the examination of the above, still unknown passage of Ḩwānīs of Dārā’s Treaus on the Soul has lead us to discover the most ancient witness of the theme of the fourfold classification of virtues and vices, by proving the existence of a removed common Syriac source of this tradition prior to the 9th century, which was very probably translated from a lost Greek original. Moreover, the existence of a Syriac philosophical source directly used by two authors, Ḩwānīs of Dārā and Dawūd al-Muqammiš, who lived approximately in the same period (first half of the 9th century) and in the same geographical area (Northern Syria and Iraq), has been ascertained on philological basis. It is possible that this source was known to al-Muqammiš through the mediation of his Christian teacher, Nonnus of Nisibi, who could have access to the same texts used by Ḩwānīs of Dārā. This important fact seems to confirm the suppositions of some scholars about the direct influence of Syriac literature on some aspects of early Judaeo-Arabic philosophy and Biblical exegesis.35

34 Arist., Magna Mor. 1193 b 19 ff. For the correct Syriac term ʿawlūtā in correspondence to Greek ἀδίκεζων, see Brock, “An Abbreviated Syriac Version of Ps.-Aristotle, De Virtutibus et vitiis”, pp. 108-9.
35 About al-Muqammiš’s contacts with contemporary Christian scholars, see the remarks in Stroumsa, Dawūd Ibn Marwan al-Muqammiš’s Twenty Chapters, p. 24. By the way, the above pseudo-Gregory the Thaumaturg’s Λόγος κεφαλαίων διδάξαντος ἡττόν τῆς ζωῆς has been identified as one of the sources of another Judaeo-Arabic writing, the Commentary on the Genesis (Tafsīr Bereṣit) by Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb al-Qirṣāṣānī, who lived in the same geographical area of al-Muqammiš one century later, and knew it probably by means of a Syriac intermediate source: see B. Chiesa, Creazione e caduta dell’uomo nell’esegesi giudeo-araba medievale, Paideia, Brescia 1989 (Studi biblici), pp. 95-97.
Appendix

Greek-Syriac glossary of philosophical terms as found in Iwānnīs of Dārā’s T‏ιτισε of the Soul, compared to those found in Gregory of Nyssa’s On Soul and Resurrection and Epistle to Letoios,36 and to some terms in the Arabic version of pseudo-Plato’s On the Subsistence of Soul’s Virtues.

各县 69.21 = ܟܻܠ 44 rb 21 = ئیخ ll. 15, 16, 20;
گیاپ 69.15 = ܟܻܠ 44 rb 4;
یئیا 52.20 = ݱیٖ 42 ra 12;
یئیایی 42.2 = ݱیٖ 41 ra 15; یئیا 41 ra 16; cp. حاسة l. 18;
یئیایی 52.16 = ݱیٖ 42 ra 6;
یئیایی 82.15 = ۂیٖ 44 vb 15;
یئیایی 67.20 = ۂیٖ 44 ra 23;
یئیایی لر. 3.4 = ۂیٖ 4 vb 14;
یئیایی لر. 3.8 = ۂیٖ 14 vb 25;
یئیایی 34.7 = ۂیٖ 40 rb 20;
یئیایی 82.14 = ۂیٖ 44 vb 14;
یئیایی 42.16 = ۂیٖ 41 rb 10-11;
یئیایی لر. 3.11 = ۂیٖ 15 ra 7;
یئیایی 82.15 = ۂیٖ 44 vb 15;
یئیایی 55.13 = ۂیٖ 42 va 21;
یئیایی لر. 3.17 = ۂیٖ 15 ra 23;
یئیایی 3.13 = ۂیٖ 15 ra 12;
یئیاثیا 86.15 = ۂیٖ 45 rb 12;
یئیاثیا لر. 3.16 = ۂیٖ 15 ra 21;
یئیاثیا 55.10 = ۂیٖ 42 va 12;
یئیاثیا 70.11 = ۂیٖ 44 va 3;
یئیاثیا 3.23 = ۂیٖ 15 rb 16;
یئیاثیا 42.9, 65.15, لر. 3.10-11 = ۂیٖ 41 rb 2, 43 vb 19, 15 ra 4 = فضل ll. 24, 30;
یئیاثیا 40.4 = ۂیٖ 41 ra 8;
یئیاثیا 56.8, 95.9 = ۂیٖ 42 vb 17; ۂیٖ 45 vb 29;
یئیاثیا 58.15 = ۂیٖ 43 rb 12;
یئیاثیا 31.4 = ۂیٖ 40 ra 30-31;
یئیاثیا 86.13 = ۂیٖ 45 rb 7;
یئیاثیا 95.11 = ۂیٖ 45 vb 33;
یئیاثیا 96.6 = ۂیٖ 46 rb 11;

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36 About Iwānnīs of Dārā’s quotations of these sources, see Zonta, “Iwānnīs of Dārā’s T‏ιτισε on the Soul and its Sources”, p. 117-19. The Greek terms here below are taken from the edition of Gregory of Nyssa’s works in E. Mühlenberg (ed.), Gregorii Nysseni Opera dogmatica minora V: Epistula Canonica, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2008 (Epistle to Letoios: the references are preceded by “Ler.”); A. Spira - E. Mühlenberg † (eds.), Gregorii Nysseni Opera dogmatica minora III: Gregorii Nysseni De Anima et resurrectione, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2014 (On Soul and Resurrection). The Syriac terms refer to folios and lines of the MS Harvard. The Arabic terms refer to the lines of Table 1.
βραχύτης 27.4, 95.16 = ισχυρός 39 va 5, 46 ra 28;

γνώσις 70.2 = ισχυρός 44 rb 29;

γνωστική 54.21 = ισχυρός 42 ra 22;

dελία 37.14 = ισχυρός 40 vb 4;

dημιουργία 55.14 = ισχυρός 42 va 23;

dιαχωγή 85.20 = ισχυρός 45 ra 30;

dιάξευσις Let. 3.20 = ισχυρός 15 rb 6;

dιάθεσις Let. 3.9 = ισχυρός 14 vb 28 = l. 6;

dιακρίνει 53.9, 56.17 = ισχυρός 42 rb 4; ισχυρός 42 vb 32;

dιακρίνεσθαι 28.23 = ισχυρός 39 vb 19;

dιακριτική Let. 2.26 = ισχυρός 14 va 27;

ό ισχυρική (δύναμις) 39.12 = ισχυρός 40 vb 27;

dιακριτικόν 66.10 = ισχυρός 43 vb 25;

dιάλυσις 28.16, 53.1 = ισχυρός 39 vb 7, 42 ra 17;

dιανοητικός 38.12 = ισχυρός 40 vb 11;

dιάκτησις 54.9 = ισχυρός 42 ra 12;

dιαφορά 56.10 = ισχυρός 42 vb 23;

dόξα Let. 3.2 = ισχυρός 14 vb 2;

δύναμις 31.1, 95.11 = ισχυρός 40 ra 21, 45 vb 33;

eÎò 52.20, 53.2 = ισχυρός 42 ra 14, 19;

eîkós 53.1 = ισχυρός 42 ra 19;

eîkû̱n 27.6 = ισχυρός 39 va 8;

eîkê̱tû̱n 66.14 = ισχυρός 43 vb 29;

eîlî̱tû̱s 67.14 = ισχυρός 44 ra 11;

eîmû̱hê̱s 86.14-15 = ισχυρός 45 rb 11;

eîpû̱fû̱ 95.14 = ισχυρός 46 ra 6;

eînû̱lû̱kû̱mê̱nî Let. 3.5 = ισχυρός 14 vb 15;

eînû̱rê̱tûs Let. 3.7 = ισχυρός 14 vb 23;

ένθè̱sís 69.23 = ισχυρός 44 rb 23 = l. 35;

éntû̱rgê̱ 68.17 = ισχυρός 44 ra 27;

ένεργî̱ê̱ 65.12-13 = ισχυρός 43 vb 15;

ένους 52.21 = ισχυρός ισχυρός 42 ra 13;

έπû̱γû̱mê̱nû̱ 33.1 = ισχυρός 40 rb 10;

έπû̱dû̱ 68.17 = ισχυρός 44 ra 30;

έπû̱θû̱mû̱tû̱kû̱tû̱s 42.19 = ισχυρός 41 rb 16;

έπû̱θû̱mû̱tû̱kû̱tu̱s Let. 3.8 = ισχυρός 14 vb 22; ισχυρός 14 vb 24;

tû̱oû̱ 42.20 = ισχυρός 40 rb 4;

eîpû̱tû̱û̱mê̱hî Let. 2.26 = ισχυρός 44 ra 28; ισχυρός 44 va 27;

έπû̱sî̱mû̱a 70.12 = ισχυρός 44 va 6 = l. 35;

έρωτî̱kû̱ Let. 3.9 = ισχυρός 14 vb 28;

έσû̱fû̱mê̱nî Let. 3.5 = ισχυρός 14 vb 16;

έτερû̱gê̱nû̱ 11.1 = ισχυρός 39 ra 14;

έτερû̱gê̱nû̱ 29.2 = ισχυρός 39 vb 21;

έτερû̱gê̱nû̱ 8.1 = ισχυρός 38 va 22;
τὸ εὐκίνητον 84.16 = καὶ ἄν ἵππος 45 ra 2;

ζέσις 37.4 = καὶ ἄναμμων 40 va 19;

ἡδονὴ 37.9, 37.15 = καὶ ἀναδεήσετε 40 va 26; καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 vb 5;

ἡ Θεωρητικὴ (δύναμις) 39.12 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 vb 27;

Θεωρητικὸν 66.9 = καὶ ἄναμμων 43 vb 24-25; 

ψάχνεις 37.14 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 vb 5;

tὸ ὑποτευκτὸν 96.6 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 46 rb 10;

tὸ ὑμωνεῖδης 32.20 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 rb 4;

θυμός 35.5, 65.13 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 va 3; καὶ ἀνασκοπή 43 vb 16;

θυμωδίης Let. 3.16 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 15 ra 20;

καθ’ ἐκυπέρην 10.6 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 38 vb 25;

κακίᾳ 42.9 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 41 rb 2;

καλλος 40.4 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 41 ra 7-8;

κατὰ τὸ ἔσον 30.19 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 ra 14;

κατασκευὴ 32.21 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 rb 7;

κατακρίνοντος 37.15 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 vb 6;

κατάθωσις Let. 2.25 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 14 va 23;

κεννάζει Let. 3.13 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 15 ra 12;

τὰ κυνήματα 40.2 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 41 ra 4;

κοινωνία 28.2, 57.15-16 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 39 va 20; καὶ ἀνασκοπή 43 ra 26;

τὸ κρείττον 38.16 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 vb 16; cp. ἐρ. l. 6;

χρῖς 60.25 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 43 rb 19;

λεπτομέρεια 56.2 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 42 vb 4-5;

tὸ λεπτὸν 84.16 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 45 ra 1;

ἡ λογικὴ (δύναμις) 42.1 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 41 ra 13;

τὸ λογικὸν 82.14-15 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 44 vb 14;

λόγος 31.3, 42.13 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 ra 26; καὶ ἀνασκοπή 41 rb 6;

λουθοῖα Let. 3.24 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 15 rb 20;

λύπη 37.15 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 40 vb 5;

μεταυπάτη 52.20 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 42 ra 12;

μηχανὴ 55.9 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 42 va 8;

μιξίζ 52.22 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 42 ra 14;

μίσος Let. 3.24 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 15 rb 19;

μνήμη 67.17 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 44 ra 14;

tὰ ὀλκεῖα 28.14 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 39 vb 3;

ὅλεος 7.14 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 38 va 8;

ὀλκεῖος 52.22 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 42 ra 16;

ὅλη 7.15 = καὶ ἀνασκοπή 38 va 10;
Here, the MS Harvard has the erroneous reading mgazyūtā, "want, lack".
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οὐλὴ 57.12 = 43 ra 28;
τὰ ὑποκείμενα Let. 3.1 = 14 vb 4;
ὑπόλευσες 51.5-6, Let. 2.26 = 41 vb 8, 14 va 25;
ὑπομονή 61.5 = 43 rb 28;
ὑπόστασις 70.14 = 44 va 9;

ψῆνος Let. 3.24 = 15 rb 18;
ψόμος 37.15 = 40 vb 6;
ψύχης 29.5, 91.6 = 39 vb 27, 45 rb 29; cp. “natural” l. 2;

χείσις 42.8 = 41 ra 13;
χώρα 86.14 = 45 rb 10;

ψυχή 39.17 = 41 ra 4 = l. 11.