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

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

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

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The International Centre "Incontro di culture" (GrAL)

Università di Pisa
Università degli Studi di Padova
École Pratique des Hautes Études - Paris

The Lectures of the Centre "Incontro di culture"

La trasmissione dei testi filosofici e scientifici dalla tarda antichità al medioevo islamico e cristiano (dal greco al siriaco, all'arabo e al latino)

"Incontro di culture" (GrAL) is an International Centre dedicated to the advanced study of the transmission of philosophical texts. Founded in 2006 as a joint programme of the two Universities of Pisa and Padua, it is located in Pisa, Italy. A distinguished Medievalist, Prof. Gianfranco Fioravanti was its Director from 2006 to 2012. The Centre is currently chaired by Prof. Mauro Tulli, former President of the International Plato Society. The École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris, is supportive of the activities of the Centre, thanks to the participation of its scholars as teachers and chairpersons of the annual workshops organised by the Centre.

"Incontro di culture" attracts senior and younger scholars from the Università degli Studi di Padova, the École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris, the Université Saint-Joseph (Beyrouth), and the Université Cadi Ayyad (Marrakesh). A vibrant community of research has been created in these years, which is not limited to France, Italy, Lebanon and Morocco, but also includes PhD students from various European countries.

"Incontro di culture" pays special attention to top research training in the field of the Graeco-Arabic, Graeco-Syriac, Graeco-Latin and Arabic-Latin translations. An annual meeting is organised, especially for PhD students from Italy and abroad. Sessions take place either in Pisa or in Padua. The meetings provide a research-oriented instruction on the translations into Arabic and Latin, and their focus is each year on a different work, or corpus, of classical or late antique Greek philosophy (website: www.gral.unipi.it). The topics dealt with to date (2006-2013) include:

- 1st meeting (February 2006): *Costituzione e diffusione del corpus aristotelico dalla tarda antichità al mondo di lingua araba*
- 2nd meeting (February 2007): *Formazione e diffusione del corpus platonico dall'antichità al mondo di lingua araba*
- 3rd meeting (February 2008): *Il* De Anima *di Aristotele: esegesi greche, arabe e latine*
- 4th meeting (May 2009): *Dal greco all'arabo e al latino: i* Parva Naturalia *di Aristotele*
- 5th meeting (April 2010): *Il* Timeo. *Esegesi greche, arabe, latine*
- 6th meeting (May 2011): *Metodi, obiettivi e contesti della formazione intellettuale tra tarda antichità e primo Medioevo a Roma, Seleucia-Ctesifonte e Bagdad*
- 7th meeting (May 2012): *L'*Etica Nicomachea*: recezione tardo-antica, araba, bizantina e medievale*
- 8th meeting (May 2013): *La* Retorica *di Aristotele e la dottrina delle passioni*

At the end of each meeting, the participants are awarded a diploma that is acknowledged from the PhD programme of most of the original Universities.

It is our privilege to present to the readership of *Studia graeco-arabica* a selection of the lectures given within the context of the meetings.

Studia graeco-arabica gratefully acknowledges the valuable help provided by the Libraries mentioned at pp. 218 and 239-63. Their Directors granted us the permission, and their staff substantially helped us to publish the tables of the above-mentioned pages.

The Arabic Adaptation of the Parva Naturalia *(*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*)*

Rotraud Hansberger

Abstract
Lecture held on May 12th, 2009, Pisa, Santa Croce in Fossabanda, 4th meeting of the programme "GrAL", *Dal greco all'arabo e al latino: i* Parva Naturalia *di Aristotele*.[1]

As many of you may know, the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* has long been shrouded in some mystery. Scholars of Arabic thought knew that a medieval Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* must have existed, because it was referred to and quoted by several medieval Arabic authors, by Muslim as well as Jewish thinkers. The best example is Ibn Rushd's *Talḫīṣ*, on which Marc Geoffroy will speak later on.

While scholars were aware of this, the text of the Arabic version itself had not come to light. This was all the more tantalizing as it was clear from the secondary witnesses that the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* could not really have been a straightforward translation of the Greek version we know, but must have contained quite different ideas.

This rather unsatisfactory situation changed in 1985 when Professor Hans Daiber discovered the text of the Arabic *Parva Naturalia* in a manuscript in India. Now, after another few decades, we will hopefully have an edition available in print soon. Nevertheless the mystery will not be disappearing entirely or with immediate effect. The text of the Arabic *Parva Naturalia – Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, as it is known in Arabic – still holds a multitude of questions. Or rather, while it answers some of our questions, it also brings up a whole barrage of new ones.

To start with, the situation regarding the textual transmission is not exactly satisfactory. There is currently still only one manuscript available, Ms Arab 1752 in the Raza Library in Rampur, India. To make matters worse, this manuscript is not only quite late, dating (probably) from the 17th century, but moreover also incomplete: the beginning of our text is missing. Furthermore it does not reveal any names or dates of any people involved in the production of the text, i.e. the translator or adaptor. All this means that we are not very well informed about the process of the textual transmission of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*. This is again particularly unfortunate as the text itself is not homogeneous, not very clear, and not clearly structured. This means that there is a distinct possibility that the process of transmission may have had an impact on the way the text looks today.

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[1] This lecture is based on material that I have discussed elsewhere in more detail. For a more extensive presentation and full references, see my "*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*. Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic Guise", in Chr. Grellard - P.-M. Morel (eds), *Les* Parva Naturalia *d'Aristote*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 2010, pp. 143-62; "How Aristotle Came to Believe in God-Given Dreams: The Arabic Version of *De Divinatione per somnum* ", in L. Marlow (ed.), *Dreaming Across Boundaries. The Interpretation of Dreams in Islamic Lands*, Ilex Foundation - Harvard U. P., Washington D.C. 2008, pp. 50-77; "The Transmission of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic", D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007.

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However, even if we disregard those problems of transmission and focus on parts of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* which we can reasonably argue to be core passages of the text, we will still encounter enough interesting problems.

As already mentioned, there has long been the suspicion that the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* was not an exact counterpart of the Greek text. In fact, *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* is much more of an adaptation than a translation, and a very free adaptation at that. It does use bits and pieces from the Aristotelian text, which after all it purports to represent, but it also includes large amounts of other material, featuring theories and ideas originating in Neoplatonic philosophy and in late ancient medical thought generally associated with the name of Galen.

The text furthermore seems to have been produced in several stages of adaptation. I think there was one main stage of adaptation in which most of those 'alien' ideas were introduced. But there also appear to be some later glosses that have been incorporated into the text.

Most importantly, though, the translation from Greek into Arabic seems to represent a separate stage that predates the adaptation; which means that the main adaptor used the Aristotelian text in translation, i.e. he produced his text working with that translation. This of course also implies that the adaptation was not written in Greek and then translated into Arabic, but that it was produced in Arabic to start with.

This does not mean that there ever was a full, complete, fine and faithful Arabic translation of the *Parva Naturalia*. In fact, this is rather unlikely. We cannot say much about the translation itself, because only precious little of it is left in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*. But as far as I can tell it was not a very good translation, it was not very complete, and it certainly was not faithful. It is possible that the first translator himself was already in the business of adapting the text, but it is also very likely that he simply struggled with the text and faced serious difficulties in translating it. This again might be due to several factors. Perhaps his skills were not up to scratch; or perhaps the Greek manuscript he was working from was defective.

Although there are no fixed dates available for the text, the translation appears to be relatively early: it probably was produced early in the 9th century. The overall adaptation, on the other hand, shares features with some texts produced by translators working for the philosopher al-Kindī (the so-called Kindī Circle), notably the Arabic Plotinus. Therefore it can be dated to the 9th century. As some of you will know, such adaptations are not uncommon amongst the works of the Kindī Circle. Take the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, where passages of Plotinus' *Enneads* in a somewhat tendentious Arabic translation are expanded upon by added material, putting a certain spin on the text and thus resulting in an altered general interpretation of Plotinus' ideas.[2]

But even in comparison with texts like the *Theology of Aristotle*, *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* must be regarded as an extreme case. Therefore I hesitate somewhat to declare that it is a work of the Kindī Circle plain and simple. There is indeed a strong link, but *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* does not resemble any single one of the known Kindī Circle texts closely enough to enable us to say that it was authored by the same person who, e.g., produced the *Theology of Aristotle* or Pseudo-Ammonius' *Doxography*.[3]

Now let us have a closer look at the text itself. It is important to keep in mind that *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* does present itself as the Arabic translation of the *Parva Naturalia* and claims to be

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[2] See e.g. P. Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle*, Duckworth, London 2002.

[3] U. Rudolph, *Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonios: ein Beitrag zur neuplatonischen Überlieferung im Islam*, Steiner, Wiesbaden - Stuttgart 1989.

authored by Aristotle. There is no mention of it being a summary, an adaptation or a commentary or anything of the kind, so if you read it without any background knowledge, you would think it was indeed a book by Aristotle.

Its title, *Book on Perception and the Perceived*, refers to the first of the six treatises that are reflected in the text: *De Sensu et sensato*, which is represented in the first part (*Maqāla* 1). As I said, most of this part is unfortunately missing in the only available manuscript.

The second part or *maqāla* comprises *De Memoria et reminiscentia* on the one hand, and the three books *De Somno et vigilia*, *De Insomniis* and *De Divinatione per somnum* on the other. The latter three are integrated in one chapter, the *Chapter on Sleep and Waking*. The third and last *maqāla* is equivalent to *De Longitudine et brevitate vitae*.

Maqāla 1:	*Fī l-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs** (“On sense-perception and the perceived”: ~ *De Sensu et sensato*)
Maqāla 2:	*Fī l-Ḏikr wa-l-taḏakkur* (“On memory and recollection”: ~ *De Memoria et reminiscentia*)
	Bāb al-Nawm wa-l-yaqaẓa (“Chapter on sleep and waking”: ~ *De Somno et vigilia, De Insomniis, De Divinatione per somnum*)
Maqāla 3:	*Fī ṭūl al-ʿumr wa-qiṣarihī* (“On length and shortness of life”: ~ *De Longitudine et brevitate vitae*)

Having listened to the previous speakers, this structure will look familiar to you by now. It is interesting to note that the three books on sleeping and dreaming are represented by one chapter, which is furthermore taken together with *De Memoria* to make up one tract – especially since we have heard of a similar case in Professor Hoffmann’s presentation earlier. This way of combining the treatises is also indicated in a list of Aristotle’s works that was compiled in Late Antiquity by a person called Ptolemy (today only extant in Arabic). It hence seems that there was a certain tradition of ordering the treatises in this way.

On the face of it the structure may look quite neat, but in reality not much of these Aristotelian treatises is left within the Arabic text. It is in fact the additional material that makes up the biggest part of the text. And this added material is not clearly separated from passages of translation: we do not get first a section of translated text and then a section of something else, be it a commentary or a piece of a different text added to the translation. Instead, translation and added material are woven closely together, so that it is at times hard to identify translated Aristotelian text with any degree of certainty. In order to know what is going on in the text one therefore needs to pick things apart, as it were, and compare it closely with the relevant sections of the Greek text of the *Parva Naturalia*.

To give you a rough quantitative estimate, on the whole at best 30% of the Greek text shows up in the Arabic text in some way or other. We can say that about 30% of *De Memoria* and *De Somno* are somehow represented in the Arabic, in the case of *De Longitudine* it is more, about 40%. In case of *De Sensu* there is nothing left that could count as relating to Aristotle (which will be due to its defective textual transmission), and of *De Insomniis* and *De Divinatione* we only find traces in the Arabic.

Conversely, about 30% of the Arabic text of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* can be said to represent Aristotelian text (again varying between the individual treatises); the majority of the text, however, consists of other material.

The distribution of the Aristotelian segments within the Arabic text follows a curious pattern. At the beginnings of the Arabic *maqāla*s and chapters the Aristotelian text is reproduced relatively faithfully, with a few explicative comments thrown in. The further a chapter progresses, however, the

shorter the Aristotelian sentences become, and the more non-Aristotelian material is added, until we find whole pages of added material with only the occasional keyword that may – or may not – stem from the Aristotelian text, as well as long passages that do not refer at all to anything in Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. Of course, at this point one can never be entirely sure whether such words actually refer to the Aristotelian text or whether the similarity is just accidental. However, in some cases one can still see that a single word must stem from Aristotle's text, even if it appears in a strange context.

All this means that *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* does not convey much of Aristotle's thought; instead it is the preferred theories of the adaptor, represented in the added material, that dominate the whole text. This is so not only because of the overwhelming quantity of added material, but also because these theories are often presented in a more cohesive manner than the fragments of Aristotelian text, and in fact also influence the way in which whatever is left of the Aristotelian text is interpreted in the overall context.

Let us now have a look at the first textual example.[4] It is the very beginning of the second *maqāla*, corresponding to *De Memoria*.

1)
Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 10 r 9-25 (*Fī l-Ḏikr*)

المقالة الثانية من الحِسِّ وَالمَحْسُوس في الذكر والرؤيا والعبارة (1) قد يجب علينا أن نتكلّم في الذكر والتذكّر وما سببهما (2) وفي أيِّ قوى من قوى النفس يعرض هذا الألم حتّى يذكر الشيء الذي قد فات ومضى (3) وليس هذا لازماً للعامّ بل هو لازم للأكثر من أجل أنّه ليس الكلّ حافظاً ولا الكلّ ذاكراً (4) وأن نعلم أيضاً لِمَ صار البطيء الحركة أذكر للأشياء والسريع الحركة أحفظ لها (5) لنقول إنّ الذي يذكر الأشياء ليس كالذي يحفظها (6) لأنّ الذي يحفظ ليس يحتاج إلى الذكر لأنّ الحفظ دائم متّصل والذي يذكر الأشياء إنّما يذكرها بعد نسيان فلذلك صار الذكر الحفظ المنقطع [...].

Second Treatise of [the Book on] Sense-Perception and the Perceived: on Memory, Dream-vision and [its] Interpretation. – (1) **We will have to speak about memory and recollection and [about] what their cause is;** (2) **and [we must discuss] to which of the soul's faculties this affection occurs, so that something that has passed and gone will be remembered.** (3) This does not pertain to everyone, but it in fact pertains to most, since not all people are retaining [things in their memory], nor are all people recollecting. (4) We also [need] to know why **a person of slow movement is better at recollecting things while a person of quick movement is better at retaining them [in memory]**, (5) so that we say **that the person who recollects things is not like the person who retains them in memory.** (6) For the person who retains them does not need [recollective] memory, because retentive memory is permanent and continuous, whereas the person who recollects things does so only after forgetting [them]. This is why [recollective] memory is discontinuous retentive memory [...]

Arist., *De Memoria*, I 449 b 4-9 (Aristotle, *Parva Naturalia*, ed. by W.D. Ross, Oxford U. P., Oxford 1955)
(Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως)
(1) Περὶ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν λεκτέον τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν γίγνεται (2) καὶ τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι· (5) οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι μνημονικοὶ καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, (4) ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μνημονικώτεροι μὲν οἱ βραδεῖς, ἀναμνηστικώτεροι δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς.

[4] The textual examples are based on my edition and translation of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* (in preparation).

(On memory and recollection)
(1) In discussing memory and remembering, it is necessary to say what they are, (2) and how their occurrence is to be explained, and to which part of the soul this affection, and recollecting, belong. (5) For it is not the same people who are good at remembering and recollecting. (4) Rather, for the most part, slow people are better at remembering, while those who are quick and learn well are better at recollecting (trans. R. Sorabji, *Aristotle. On Memory*, Duckworth, London 1972, p. 47).

I have numbered the sentences in order to indicate corresponding sentences in the Arabic text and in the Greek *Parva Naturalia*. Furthermore, in the English translation of the Arabic text words that have a counterpart in the Greek are printed in bold face – this does not mean that it is a correct translation, it just means that it reflects something in the Greek, be it right or wrong.

So you can see quite easily that there are correspondences in sentences 1, 2, 4, and 5. The Greek is translated reasonably faithfully. There are, obviously, some additions, clauses we do not find in Aristotle's text – 3, 6 –; but they do not introduce new ideas but just try to explicate further what has been said. One little mistake, however, can be found in sentence 4: the Arabic translation confuses the connection between slow movement and remembering and fast movement and recollecting respectively, saying instead that the slow person recollects well and the fast person remembers well. In this case, I think we are looking at a honest mistake, without any 'ideological' reasons looming in the background; the text does not come back in any way to this question.

Incidentally, this mistake is indirectly reflected in Ibn Rushd's *Talḫīṣ*; it seems to me that in the relevant section[5] Ibn Rushd is trying to find a way of avoiding to say this plainly, and of associating slowness with recollection and fastness with remembering in a more complicated way – probably because he did not find the way in which it was mentioned in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* at all convincing.

This, then, is an example from one end of the spectrum, giving us a reasonable representation of Aristotelian text in the Arabic. However, if you look over the next 3 examples – 2 to 4 – you see that there is no bold print at all, i.e. no correspondence to the Aristotelian text whatsoever. They are taken from the middle of *Bāb al-Nawm*, the chapter on sleep, dreams, and divinatory dreams. Here we do not have many references to the Greek any more: instead, the preferred theory of the Arabic adaptor comes to the fore.

The three examples represent the core of the adaptor's theory. The topic he is most concerned with is that of divinatory dreams. Now, you all know that Aristotle expresses himself rather sceptically with regard to divinatory dreams. Although he does say that people have veridical dreams that foretell future events, he denies that such dreams are sent by God and instead strives to find physical and physiological explanations for such phenomena.

Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, on the other hand, does not cast the shadow of a doubt on the assumption that veridical dreams are sent by God, it takes that as a given. What it then does is to provide an explanation of how such dreams can happen: in terms of psychology, and in terms of the necessary metaphysical framework. This theme takes over much of *Bāb al-Nawm*; it seems that the whole chapter, and partly also the first chapter of the second *maqāla*, the equivalent to *De Memoria*, is geared towards this theory.

At the heart of the psychological part of the explanation is a theory of the mental faculties that is derived from late ancient medicine. It involves the three faculties called formative faculty or imagination, faculty of thought, and faculty of memory. Though not possessing corporeal organs,

[5] Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, ed. H. Blumberg, Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge Mass. 1972 (Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, vers. arab. 7), pp. 49-51.

these faculties are located in the ventricles of the brain and are supposed to function by virtue of the 'animal spirit', which the medics supposed to be made of the finest possible matter.[6]

The normal functions of these faculties have to do with the processing of sense-perceptions that are conveyed to them through the sensitive faculty, the common sense. In *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, this is seen and presented not so much in terms of what it means to imagine or remember something, as in terms of a kind of abstraction process which rids a perception more and more of its corporeal elements, making it increasingly 'spiritual'. This process starts with the perception of the perceptible object through the sense faculty; the next step is the storing of this perception, or 'form', in the formative faculty; then follows the step in which the faculty of thought distinguishes between this form and its *maʿnā*; the *maʿnā* is, as it were, the 'noetic core' of the form; it is the particular thing in so far as it is represented by *thought* only, without any sensitive aspect. (I deliberately do not translate the term because the usual translations, e.g. 'intention', would be anachronistic and unsuitable for the way in which it is used in this particular text). This *maʿnā* is, finally, what the faculty of memory will store.

Let us look at example (2), then.

2)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 40 v 1-26 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)

فإذا كان في حدّ النوم أحضر ذلك المعنى مع الصورة فيرى النائم صور أشياء وتعبّر له بذلك المعنى الذي كان عند الفكر فيظنّ حينئذ صاحب الرؤيا أنّ تلك الرؤيا صادقة وذلك الشيء الذي يراه حقّ وهو باطل أجمع لا معنى له وإنّما يكون ذلك من أجل هذه القوى الروحانيّة أعني المصوّر والفكر والذكر لأنّ هذه القوى لا تسكن حركتها في حدّ النوم ولا فعلها فإذا سكنت الطبيعة وصارت مستبطنة نحو النفس سكن البدن فإذا سكن البدن سكنت الحواسّ فإذا سكنت الحواسّ رجع الحسّ المشترك إلى المصوّر فينظر إلى صور الأشياء التي رآها في حدّ الجسمانيّة نظراً روحانياً وقد كان ينظر إليها وهي جسمانيّة متحرّكة وهو ينظر إليها عند المصوّر ساكنة ولا حركة لها فهي في حدّ السكون أتقن وأحسن منها وهي متحرّكة.

For when [the person] is in the realm of sleep he makes that *maʿnā* present together with the form. Hence the sleeper sees forms of things, and their interpretation is given to him through that *maʿnā* which has [already] been in [the faculty of] thought. Then the person who is having the dream-vision will believe that dream-vision to be veridical, and the thing which he is seeing to be a reality; whereas it is entirely vain, and does not have any *maʿnā*. This occurs due to nothing but these spiritual faculties – I mean the formative [faculty], [the faculty of] thought and [the faculty of] memory – as neither the movement, nor the activity of these faculties rest in the realm of sleep. For when the nature rests and is absorbed in the soul, then the body rests; and when the body rests the senses rest, and when the senses rest, the common sense resorts to the formative [faculty], and looks with a spiritual gaze at the forms of things which it has seen in the realm of corporeality. [Before], it used to look at them when they were corporeal and in motion, whereas [now] it looks at them being at rest and motionless in the formative [faculty], with them being more perfect and excellent when at rest than when they are moving.

In the second example, we see how the three faculties, the formative faculty, the faculty of thought and the faculty of memory, are involved in dreaming and veridical dreaming: while the body rests in sleep, they stay active, as they are not corporeal. They occupy themselves with earlier perceptions that

[6] Cf. e.g. R.E. Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, Warburg Institute, London 1975, pp. 4-8.

are stored in memory; and they also assign interpretations – *maʿānī* – to such perceptions. When they do that, the sleeper will think that he has a veridical dream, even if that is not the case.

However, there *are* true dream-visions, dreams that predict the future. This is what we find addressed in the next example, text (3).

3)
Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 41 r 5-11 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)
فأمّا الرؤيا الصحيحة الروحانيّة فهي التي تكون من نحو معقولات العقل الكليّ لا من نحو معقولات العقل المكتسب التي لم يطلع الحسّ المشترك عليها ولم يصوّرها المصوّر ولم يعرف الفكر معناها ولا هي مستودعة عند الذكر فهذه الصور إذا ظهرت في حدّ الرؤيا ونظَر إليها الحسّ المشترك والمصوّر وسائر القوى علمت أنّ الصور التي تأتيها من المحسوسات الجسمانيّات باطل

As for the sound, spiritual dream-vision, it is the one which comes about from intelligibles of the universal intellect, not from intelligibles of the acquired intellect, [i.e. it comes from intelligibles] which are unknown to the common sense and have not been imagined by the formative [faculty]; the *maʿnā* of which [the faculty of] thought does not know, and which are not deposited in [the faculty of] memory. When these forms appear in the realm of dream-vision, and when the common sense, the formative [faculty] and all other faculties look at them, they know that the forms coming to them from corporeal objects of perception are something vain.

In this case, of course, the forms and *maʿānī* cannot go back to previous perceptions – because we could not have seen the events in question yet. This means: The forms must come from outside, and from a credible source. This source is identified as the 'universal intellect'.

Now we have arrived at the metaphysical and cosmological framework of the theory. It is essentially Neoplatonic in character, but has been adjusted so as to fit the requirements of scriptural religion. This we can observe in text (4).

4)
Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 42 r 2-15 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)
فهذه الرؤيا الحقّ التي سببها وعلّتها الإله الحقّ جلّ ثناؤه بتوسّط العقل لأنّ كلّ ما أراد الإله جلّ ثناؤه أن يظهر في هذا العالم صوّره في العقل بدفعة واحدة وصوّر صوره في هذا العالم معما يلزمها من المنطق في دفعة واحدة فأظهر العقل للنفس ولكلّ قوّة من قوى النفس على قدر ما بتّت النفس ما للقوّة أن تقبله على أنّ العلّة العظمى أعني الإله جلّ ثناؤه هكذا أبدع حيث أبدع العقل في ذلك الوقت لإظهار ما عنده لأنّ الإله حرّكه في ذلك الوقت لإظهار ما عنده

Such [is] the true dream-vision, the cause and reason of which is the true Deity, great be His praise, through the mediation of the intellect. For whatever the Deity, great be His praise, wanted to become manifest in this world He represented in the intellect in one stroke, and represented its forms in this world in one stroke, together with their logical implications. The intellect then made [them] manifest to the soul and to each one of its faculties, according to the measure in which the soul decided that [each] faculty should receive [them]; although the Supreme Cause, I mean the Deity, great be His praise, created [them] in this way, when He created the intellect at that time, in order to make manifest what is in it; because the Deity moved [the intellect] at that time in order to make manifest what is in it.

God creates everything there is first in the universal intellect, in one single act of creation; only then are things created in the forms in which they appear in this world. This means that the things

exist within the universal intellect before they appear in corporeal form, and over time, in this world; hence the intellect can reveal them to human souls before they occur in the world. This is also how the phenomenon of dream interpretation can be explained: the universal intellect can reveal something to one person in form of a dream – as a spiritual form – while to another person it reveals its *maʿnā*, its noetic core, as it were, without the 'visualised' dream image.

Associated with this is a hierarchy of forms: the 'intellectual form' in the intellect; the *maʿnā*, i.e. the thing as it is thought of in the human mind; the spiritual form, which is revealed as dream and therefore has a sensual aspect, and lastly the corporeal form of the actual, created event happening in the world.

Much of this theory the adaptor will have found in his sources; he did not make it up from scratch. The involvement of these mental faculties in divinatory dreams, for example, is a topic that is already mentioned in late ancient Greek authors like Nemesius of Emesa[7] – divinatory dreams were an acknowledged fact of life in Christianity and Judaism as well as Islam. What he does is to weave them together with bits and pieces of the Aristotelian text, and thus, in the end, to present the result as Aristotle's theory.

However, he also has his very own contribution to make. There are certain elements in the theory that we can see him emphasise specifically.

First, he is very fond of hierarchy and linear hierarchical order; secondly, he advocates a clear dichotomy between corporeality and spirituality, where spirituality seems to lose its interim position and becomes equated with absolute incorporeality, and hence with the divine world. This does not always work out well within context and therefore creates inconsistencies at times.

Thus we find a strong emphasis on hierarchies that are played out in terms of spirituality and corporeality. For example, the processing of perceptual forms by the three faculties is described as a process of increasing spirituality, and of purification; the adaptor here also attaches a moralistic, evaluating overtone.

How do we know, though, that this tendency was not already found in his sources but is the adaptor's own contribution? The answer is that there are certain passages where one can see the adaptor at work, as it were. These are passages where he links Aristotelian text and added material together. At such points we know that he was not working from one particular source but had to be creative in order to join two different sources together.

We will examine this aspect with the help of the remaining textual examples.

5)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, ff. 10 v 25 – 11r 12 (*Fī l-Ḏikr*)

(1) وأقول أيضاً إنّ كلّ ما رآه المرء أو سمعه أو أحسّه أو أبصره أو لمسه فإنّه إذا فعل فعلاً بالذكر فإنّه لا يقول في نفسه إنّي قد حسست هذا أو سمعته [أو] أبصرته (2) بل إنّما يطلبه بنوع وجود آخر هو أشرف من وجود الحسّ (3) لأنّ الذكر ليس هو حسّاً (4) تدرك به الأشياء لأنّه لا يمكن أن يدرك الحسّ الأشياء إلّا بجرم (5) فأمّا الذكر فإنّه قوّة غريزيّة تدرك الأشياء مجرّدة (6) وليس تدركها إلّا بعد زمان (7) فأمّا أن يدركها زمان وجودها أو في الزمان الآتي فهذا ليس فعل الذكر ولا يجوز أن يقال في الذكر

(1) I also say that **whatever** a man sees, hears, senses, looks at or touches, **when he acts** [on it] **with [his] memory**, **he will** not **say in his soul**: **'I have sensed this' or 'I have heard it' or 'I have seen it'**
(2) but he will search for it in another way which is more noble than finding it by sense-perception.

[7] Cf. e.g. Nemesius of Emesa, *De Natura hominis*, ed. M. Morani, Teubner, Leipzig 1987(Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), pp. 40, 68.

(3) **For memory is not sense-perception**, (4) by which things are perceived, because sense-perception can perceive things through a body only. (5) As for memory, it is an **innate** faculty which perceives things [in] abstracted [form], (6) and it perceives them only **after time [has passed]**. (7) As for perceiving them at the time of their existence or in the time to come, this is not the function of memory, nor can it be attributed to memory.

Arist., *De Memoria*, 449 b 22-25 (ed. Ross).
(1) ἀεῖ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν. (3) ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, (5?) ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, (6) ὅταν γένηται χρόνος.
(1) For whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul in this way that he heard, or perceived, or thought this before. (3) Therefore memory is not perception or conception, (5) but a state or affection connected with one of these, (6) when time has elapsed (trans. Sorabji, *Aristotle. On Memory*, p. 48).

Text (5) is a seemingly harmless example from the first part of *Maqāla* 2 (*De Memoria*). As you can see from the bold print, there are correspondences in clauses 1, 3, 5 and 6 (disregard the one in 5, which is a special case).

However, does the Arabic text say the same as the Greek? No: due to the negation in sentence 1 it actually says the exact opposite. So what has happened? Are we looking at a mistake? Or is there something more behind it?

After all, the result fits in with the adaptor's theory: memory is more noble than sense-perception, it does not have anything to do with impure sensibles or with bodily organs. This agrees with his idea of memory being the highest of the three mental faculties, dealing with *maʿānī* only. So, did the adaptor 'smuggle in' the negation to be able to make that point? This could be a tempting suggestion.

There is, however, a simpler explanation. The word οὕτως may have been misread – or, in fact, misspelt in the Greek manuscript – as οὔπως. This is something that could easily have happened; hence it is a rather convincing explanation. Furthermore, it is hard to see why the adaptor would have wanted to insert a negation into this first sentence: *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* does emphasise several times in other places that one can only remember what one has perceived earlier. Thus there must have been better ways to make the point about the difference between memory and sense-perception than producing this rather counterintuitive negation.

It therefore makes sense to assume that this was an innocent mistake to begin with. But we also have to note that the adaptor makes the most of it, and uses it very efficiently to make a point that fits in very well with his own theory. Of course one has to bear in mind that unclarities as presented by this rather odd negative sentence would in any case invite an adaptor to comment, explain and improve.

6)
Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, ff. 21 v 6 – 22 r 24 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)
(1) وقد يصحّ هذا ويعُرف من اليقظان والنائم وذلك أنّ النائم قد يحسّ بأشياء كثيرة وهولا يشكّ أنّ تلك الأشياء التي يحسّها في نومه أنّها في يقظته (2) والفصل الذي بين حسّ اليقظان والنائم أنّ النائم إنّما يحسّ من داخل وحسّه ذلك من غير حركة منه واليقظان يحسّ من خارج وذلك الحسّ بحركة (3) فنقول إذاً قد استبان فصل ما بين حسّ النائم واليقظان أيّ الحسّين أوفق وأصوب

ومن الواجب أن يُعرف هذا ويعلم (4) فنقول إنّ حسّ النائم حسّ بالقوّة وحسّ اليقظان حسّ بالفعل (5) وكلّ ما هو بالقوّة فإنّه عسر إدراكه وما كان بالفعل فإنّه مدرك معلوم (6) وحسّ النائم وإن كان بالقوّة فقد يخرج إلى الفعل غير أنّ منه ما يخرج خروجا بيّنا واضحا ومنه ما هو عسر غير بيّن (7) فأمّا أتقنهما وأشرفهما فإنّ الروحانيّ أشرف من الجسمانيّ وليس الروحاني أشرف من الجسمانيّ عند الجسمانيّ ولا الجسمانيّ أشرف من الروحانيّ عند الروحانيّ بل الروحانيّ أشرف من الجسمانيّ عند الروحانيّ والجسمانيّ أشرف من الروحانيّ عند الجسمانيّ إلّا أنّه غير ممكن أن يكون الروحانيّ أشرف عند الجسمانيّ البتّة بل قد يمكن أن يكون الروحانيّ الذي ذكرنا أنّه بالقوّة أشرف عند المرء من الجسمانيّ الذي ذكرنا أنّه بالفعل (8) والدليل على أنّ الروحانيّ أشرف من الجسمانيّ أنّ الروحانيّ دالّ على ما هو كائن في الزمان الآتي والجسمانيّ إنّما هو دالّ على ما كان في زمان الآن موجوداً فقط (9) فإذا أحّد المرء قواه بألطف الأشياء وصيّرها متّحدة فإنّه يرى ذلك الشيء الذي يراه بالقوّة كالذي يرى الشيء بالفعل وإنّما يُمنع المرء من أن يرى الأشياء بالقوّة مثل ما يراها بالفعل لأنّ قواه مفترقة [...].

(1) **This can be proven and recognised by [considering] the waking and the sleeping person**. For a sleeper will perceive many things without doubting that those things that he is perceiving in his sleep are there while he is being awake. (2) The difference between the perception of the waking and that of the sleeping person lies in that the sleeper **perceives internally** only, – and that [kind of] perception of his [takes place] without any **movement** on his part – whereas **the waking person perceives externally**, that [kind of] perception [taking place] through **movement**. (3) Let us therefore say: the difference between sense-perception of the sleeping and that of the waking person has become clear, [i.e.] which one of the two [types of] sense-perception is more apt and more correct; this ought to be recognised and known. (4) The sense-perception of the sleeper, we shall then say, is sense-perception **potentially**, whereas the sense-perception of the waking person is sense-perception **actually**. (5) Whatever is potential is hard to perceive, whereas what is actual is perceptible and knowable. (6) However, the sense-perception of the sleeper, even though potential, may emerge into actuality; although some of it will emerge in a clear and plain manner, while some of it will be difficult [to perceive] and unclear. (7) As for [the question which one is] the most perfect and the noblest of the two: the spiritual is nobler than the corporeal. However, the spiritual is not [considered] nobler than the corporeal by the corporeal, nor is the corporeal [considered] nobler than the spiritual by the spiritual; rather, the spiritual is [considered] nobler than the corporeal by the spiritual, whereas the corporeal is [considered] nobler than the spiritual by the corporeal; only that it is not at all possible that the spiritual should be [considered] nobler by the corporeal, whereas it may indeed be possible that the spiritual, which we have said to be potential, is [considered] nobler by man than the corporeal, which we have said to be actual. (8) Evidence for the spiritual being nobler than the corporeal is that the spiritual indicates what will come to be in the future, whereas the corporeal indicates what has come to exist at the present time only. (9) When a person unites his faculties through the most subtle of things and makes them a unified one, he will see the things that he sees potentially just as someone does who is seeing them actually. It is just because his faculties are separated that a man is prevented from seeing things in potentiality in the same way as the things which he sees in actuality [...].

Arist., *De Somno*, 453 b 31- 454 a 4, 454 a 7-11 (ed. Ross).

(1) ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον·ᾧ γὰρ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα γνωρίζομεν, τούτῳ καὶ τὸν καθυπνοῦντα·
(2) τὸν δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἐγρηγορέναι νομίζομεν, καὶ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα πάντα ἢ τῶν ἔξωθέν τινος

αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ κινήσεων. [...] ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ σώματος (4) (οὗ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, τούτου καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἡ δὲ λεγομένη αἴσθησις ὡς ἐνέργεια κίνησίς τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι), φανερὸν ὡς οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἴδιον, οὔτ' ἄψυχον σῶμα δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι.

(1) Again, the point is clear from the following. We recognize a person as sleeping by the same mark as that by which we recognize someone as waking. (2) It is the person who is perceiving that we consider to be awake; and we take every waking person to be perceiving either something external or some movement within himself. [...] But given that perceiving belongs neither to the soul nor to the body solely (4) (for what owns any capacity also owns its exercise; and what is called perception, in the sense of exercise, is a certain movement of the soul by means of the body), it is plain that the affection is not peculiar to the soul, nor is a soul-less body capable of perceiving (trans. D. Gallop, *Aristotle. On Sleep and Dreams*, Aris & Phillips, Peterborough 1990 / Warminster 1996, pp. 61ff.).

With text (6) we move one step further. It is taken from the beginning of *Bāb al-Nawm*. Up to where the example starts, *Bāb al-Nawm* has more or less faithfully represented the beginning of *De Somno*; this is the point now where added material first starts to creep in, until it will finally dominate the text further down the line. As the bold type indicates, correspondences remain, but they are increasingly few and far between; the correspondence deteriorates.

What does Aristotle say here? Waking is linked to perception, and as perception affects body and soul sleep and waking must also affect both soul and body.

What does the Arabic text say? The context (established in what precedes the quoted passage) affirms that the absence of sleep is waking. Thus the text speaks of the contrast between sleep and waking. As in the Greek, perception is a central theme – however, not in so far as it identifies the waking state. *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* speaks of two types of perception, one linked to sleep, and one to waking. In Aristotle, perception is described as either of external objects or internal events; in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* this turns into the distinction between external perception, assigned to waking, and internal perception, assigned to sleep. The keyword 'movement' is also taken up: external perception occurs through movement, internal perception without. The same treatment is applied to the pair *dynamis* / *energeia*: external perception is proclaimed to be actual, internal perception potential. The potential is then identified as the spiritual, the actual as the corporeal (see end of clause 7). It is then asserted at length that the spiritual is nobler than the corporeal – and not least because spiritual perception means perceiving the future, whereas corporeal perception means perceiving the present only.

The adaptor's dichotomy:	
sleep	waking
rest	motion
potentiality	actuality
spirituality	corporeality
internal perception	external perception
perception of future	perception of present
union of faculties	separation of faculties

By now it is clear where the adaptor is steering the text: right at the beginning of his chapter on sleep and waking he is already paving the way for his doctrine of divinatory dreams, including his idea

of a dichotomy between the spiritual and the corporeal. Apart from the 'spiritual' and 'corporeal', all the elements for his scheme are sourced from the Aristotelian text. This is likewise true for the notion of the 'union of faculties' vs. the 'separation of faculties', which is also derived from an Aristotelian passage, as will emerge from text (7).

7)
Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 27 v 20 f. (*Bāb al-Nawm*)
فإذا كان هذا هكذا فلا محالة أن اليقظة هو انحلال رباط القوى والنوم رباط القوى فقد بان وصحّ أنّ اليقظة ضدّ النوم.
If this is so, then **waking will inevitably [equal] the loosening of the bond** of the faculties, whereas **sleep will [equal] the [fastened] bond** of the faculties. – Thus it has been established clearly and soundly that waking is the opposite of sleep.

Arist., *De Somno*, 454 b 25-27 (ed. Ross)
τῆς δ' αἰσθήσεως τρόπον τινὰ τὴν μὲν ἀκινησίαν καὶ οἷον δεσμὸν τὸν ὕπνον εἶναί φαμεν, τὴν δὲ λύσιν καὶ τὴν ἄνεσιν ἐγρήγορσιν.
And we maintain that sleep is, in a certain way, an immobilization or 'fettering' of perception; whereas its liberation or release is waking (trans. Gallop, *Aristotle. On Sleep and Dreams*, p. 67).

In the interpretation of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, Aristotle's 'fettering of perception', i.e. the halt and lack of perception during sleep becomes a positive 'bond', a union of the faculties that in fact enables them to perceive on an even higher level.

Whatever the Aristotelian text was like that he was working from, texts (6) and (7) show that the adaptor makes very good use of it in terms of his own theory, displaying great creativity and inventiveness, together with a strong inclination towards systematisation. It seems as if he can make anything fit his theory – and it even makes some sort of sense, that is the beauty of it!

A similar case is text (8), which informs the reader about the anatomical location of the three mental faculties.

8)
Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, ff. 34 r 18 – 34 v 10 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)
(1) والدليل على <ذلك> أنّ الحواسّ إنّما تذكر كينونتها من العضو الذي منه بدء حركة [...] لأنّ الحركة لا تكون إلّا من العصب وبدء العصب من الرأس والحركة من الرأس لا محالة فقد بان وصحّ أنّ الحسّ إنّما يكون من العضو الذي منه يكون بدء الحركة وهو من الرأس (2) وفي الرأس ثلاث جوبات في وسط الرأس جوبة وفي أعلاه جوبة وفي أسفله جوبة والجوبة التي في وسط الرأس هي جوبة الفكر والجوبة السفلى موضع المصوِّر لأنّه قريب من الحسّ المشترك لأنّ الحسّ المشترك هو الذي ينال صور المحسوسات وأشكالها وأقدارها من الأجرام بالآلات الجرميّة فإذا قبل الحاسّ تلك الصور وتلك الأشكال والأقدار قبلها قبولاً بين الروحانيّة والجسمانيّة ثمّ يقبلها منه المصوِّر فيصوّرها عنده بنوع من الأنواع الروحانيّة فيها أكثر من الجسمانيّة والجوبة العالية موضع الذكر (...)
(1) Evidence for <that> is that the senses are said to come into being in that part of the body in which the movement of [...] originates; for all movement must come from the nerves, but the origin of the nerves is in the head, and [therefore] movement inevitably must originate in the head. Thus it has been established clearly and soundly **that sense-perception originates in that part of the body where the**

origin of movement lies, which is the head. (2) There are **three** ventricles in the **head**; one ventricle is [situated] in the **middle** of the **head**, one ventricle in its highest part, and one ventricle in its lowest part. The ventricle in the middle of the head is the ventricle of [the faculty of] thought, whereas the lowest ventricle is the seat of the formative [faculty], because it is close to the common sense; for the common sense is the one which obtains the forms of the perceptibles, their shapes and their measures from the bodies by means of bodily organs; hence when the sensing [faculty] receives such a form and such shapes and measures, it will receive them between spirituality and corporeality; after that, the formative [faculty] will receive them from it and will form them within it in one way or other such that spirituality will exceed corporeality within them. The uppermost ventricle is the seat of [the faculty of] memory (...).

De Somno, 455 b 31 - 456 a 3 (ed. Ross)
(1) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀρχὴ γίγνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέρους τοῖς ζῴοις ἀφ' οὗπερ καὶ ἡ τῆς κινήσεως, διώρισται πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις. (2) αὕτη δέ ἐστι τριῶν διωρισμένων τόπων ὁ μέσος κεφαλῆς καὶ τὴς κάτω κοιλίας.
(1) Now it has already been determined in other works that perception in animals originates from the same part as does movement. (2) Of three areas that have been determined, this is the one that lies midway between the head and the lower abdomen (trans. Gallop, *Aristotle. On Sleep and Dreams*, p. 73).

Aristotle speaks of three areas in the body, and specifically of the one that lies 'midway between the head and the abdomen'.

In the Arabic, this turns into the three ventricles in the head: highest, middle, lowest. What is interesting about this – apart from the fact that once again, the adaptor adjusts Aristotle's text to his purposes – are two details. First, the ancient medical texts specify the ventricles as front, middle and rear. The adaptor, on the other hand, speaks of highest, middle, and lowest (which is quite absurd if you try to picture it). While this may have originated somehow in the Aristotelian text (where head, middle, and lower abdomen are mentioned), one also has to keep in mind that the adaptor thinks in terms of a top-down hierarchy when it comes to the faculties. Second, the text speaks of *three* ventricles – and as we have just seen, this will have been triggered by the Aristotelian text. However, it is interesting to know that most medical texts actually speak of four ventricles – two in the front, one in the middle, one at the rear. There are, though, some earlier sources that also speak of three ventricles, so it may not have been an original idea of the adaptor's to reduce the number to three.[8]

I hope that I have been able to show how skilled and creative our adaptor was in using Aristotle's text to support his own preferred theory, without really committing himself to Aristotle's ideas. Those of you who know about later developments in Arabic philosophy can probably fathom how important his inventiveness should prove, for example with regard to Ibn Sīnā's theory of the internal senses. But even apart from the impact his text was to have, to see how the adaptor was working is intriguing in its own right.

We can see in detail what he was doing, and in specific instances we can also have a good guess at his motivation: obviously he was interested in a theory of divinatory dreams that Aristotle was not exactly forthcoming with; hence the adaptor did his best to supply the text with such a theory himself. But

[8] Cf. e.g. G. Strohmaier, "Avicennas Lehre von den 'Inneren Sinnen' und ihre Voraussetzungen bei Galen", in Id., *Von Demokrit bis Dante: die Bewahrung antiken Erbes in der arabischen Kultur*, Olms, Hildesheim - New York 1996, pp. 330-41 (pp. 337-8).

there is a further interesting, if rather speculative question: What did the adaptor himself think he was doing? Are we looking at a 'master plan' to wilfully distort and 'falsify' an Aristotelian text, and promote a certain theory under the name of Aristotle's? Or, at the other extreme, was the adaptor dealing with a very fragmentary and flawed translation, and was simply – and perhaps naively – trying to produce a text that made sense to him, in the honest assumption that the theory he was putting forward was what Aristotle himself would have agreed with, too? Presumably the truth will lie somewhere in the middle.

The adaptor shows a rather bold hand, lots of creativity and strong determination when it comes to promoting his favourite theory. However, before we level the charge of 'wilful distortion' against him, we should remember that we do not know the actual state of the Graeco-Arabic translation that he worked with. There are some indications that the translator was somewhat out of his depth with regard to this text. And a garbled translation will invite an adaptor to try to make sense of it as best as he can – and likely enough he will understand it according to his own convictions. Much of what we see as distortion may have appeared, to the adaptor, as 'making sense' of a problematic and perhaps fragmentary text.

One should further consider that we do not know exactly what sort of text the adaptor intended to produce, whether he actually wanted it to circulate under Aristotle's name, and whether the text we have today is a properly finished work in the first place. The textual transmission does not allow us to pass judgment on any of these matters.

Nevertheless, all these deliberations cannot 'absolve' the adaptor entirely, exactly because we have seen evidence of how he set to work in re-shaping the text. At least in part this was done very consciously; he must have felt entitled to 'play around' with his source text at least to certain extent. In a certain sense the subsequent success of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* (and its theory of divinatory dreams) has vindicated him.

All the same it would be interesting indeed to have more primary source material at hand that would help us to get closer to what really happened. For the moment, we are left with the text of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* as it is preserved in the Rampur manuscript, and all we can do is trying to analyse it as it is.